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A B S T R A C T   
In 2018, Public Health England and the UK House of Parliament introduced a soft drinks industry levy to reduce 
the amount of sugar in sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs). In addition to the positive results coming from the 
levy, in January 2019 the UK Government opened a consultation to consider regulating the use of price pro-
motions on foods high in fat, sugar, and salt content. The levy and the banning of promotions could have similar 
effects (i.e., to potentially increase the product price); however, there is no study comparing their ex-ante 
effectiveness in reducing sugar consumption and even less their distributional impact. The purpose of the pre-
sent study is to compare the effect and distributional impact of the measures. To achieve this, we estimated an 
EASI demand model using scanner panel data for Scotland for the period 2013 to 2017 (i.e., before the intro-
duction of the levy). The results from the present study show that banning promotions on soft drinks would be 
more effective in reducing energy and sugar purchases than the soft drinks levy. The effectiveness of either policy 
varies by income, life stage, location, and degree of deprivation in Scotland. This argues for targeted policies 
instead of the usual ‘one-size-fits-all’ government policy. Specifically, banning promotions could reduce the 
annual quantity of beverage purchases by 35.8 per cent whereas the soft drinks levy results in only a 1.36 per 
cent reduction in annual beverage purchases Also, banning promotions reduces annual sugar purchases by 9 per 
cent compared to 3.9 per cent for the soft drinks levy. Translating this into changes in intake show that the 
average person will lose 0.85 kg and 0.36 kg per annum for the ban on promotions or soft drinks levy, 
respectively. The marginal changes in body weight suggest that other avenues such as a tax on and/or restricting 
promotions on dietary fat should be explored to achieve a larger impact.   
1. Introduction 
Consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) predisposes 
consumers to weight gain and risk of dental caries, adiposity, and type 2 
diabetes (Hu, 2013; Mishra and Mishra, 2011). For instance, soft drink 
intake is strongly associated with increased energy intake and body 
weight (Vartanian et al., 2007). 
As a result, the UK Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition rec-
ommends minimal or reduced intakes of SSBs (Briggs et al., 2017). 
Following their recommendation, in March 2016, Public Health England 
and the UK House of Parliament Health Committee advised the UK 
Government to introduce a tax on SSBs, which became known as the soft 
drinks industry levy. The levy came into effect in 2018. The levy was 
imposed on industries manufacturing or importing sugar-sweetened 
beverages in three tiers: soft drinks with a sugar content of less than 
5 g/100 ml – no tax; drinks with sugar content 5‑8 g/100 ml – basic level 
tax; more than 8 g/100 ml – higher-level tax) (Pell et al., 2019). All kinds 
of alcoholic drinks, milk-based drinks, and fruit juices were exempted 
from the tax irrespective of their sugar composition. In addition, small 
producers were excluded from the levy1 
Industries responded to the tax through reformulation to reduce the 
sugar content of SSBs (Bandy et al., 2020). In addition, to minimize 
sugar intake, industries encouraged buyers to buy reformulated drinks 
(lower in sugar content) through advertisement (Briggs et al., 2017). 
Even though the UK government did not want the tax to be passed on to 
buyers through an increase in the retail price of SSBs, this was not 
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E-mail address: wisdom.dogbe@abdn.ac.uk (W. Dogbe).   
1 Briggs et al., 2017 showed that small producers contribute a negligible amount of 0.6% to the total UK SSB sales. As a result, we did not adjust the data to account 
for these producers. 
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guaranteed. For instance, Scarborough et al. (2020a) show that some 
manufacturers and importers passed on some amount of the soft drinks 
levy to consumers as higher prices. 
Ludbrook (2019) highlighted that taxes, subsidies, and price-based 
interventions are economic instruments that can help promote healthi-
er food and drink choices. Similarly, a policy study by Hagenaars, 
Jeurissen, and Klazinga (2017) concluded that taxation is effective in 
reducing the consumption of energy-dense products. For instance, to 
deal with the rising prevalence of obesity, Hungary raised taxes on 
sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB), energy drinks, confectionaries, 
chocolate, and salty snacks in 2011 (Escobar et al., 2013); Finland, in 
2011, raised taxes on SSB, ice-creams, chocolates, and confectionery; 
and France, in 2012, raised taxes on SSB and energy drinks (Berardi 
et al., 2016). Denmark introduced taxes on saturated fat (nutrient tax) in 
October 2011 but this change was later abolished (in 2012; Jensen et al., 
2016; Smed, 2012). 
The impact of the UK soft drinks industry levy was always going to 
vary depending on the measures adopted by the soft drink industry. For 
instance, a reformulation by Sprite and Lipton Iced Tea led to a reduc-
tion in sugar concentration by 30% in 2015 (Mason, 2015). Similarly, in 
2015, the British Soft Drinks Association projected to reduce sugar and 
caloric concentration by 20% by 2020 (British Soft Drinks Association 
(BSDA), 2016). A recent study by Pell et al. (2021) shows that soft drinks 
sugar purchases in the UK had reduced by (30 g.) 10 per cent per 
household per week one year after the implementation of the levy. 
Even though price-based interventions on unhealthy foods have been 
beneficial in western Europe and North America (see Escobar et al., 
2013; Hagenaars et al., 2017; Jensen et al., 2016), some stakeholders 
and lobby groups are campaigning for mandatory restriction on price 
promotions of unhealthy foods and beverages (Huse et al., 2020). Price 
promotions are temporary price reductions and bundle deals used by 
retailers and/or manufacturers to increase sales (Chandon, 1995). Ac-
cording to Backholer, Sacks, and Cameron (2019) buyers are more 
responsive to price promotions on unhealthy foods and beverages than 
healthy foods. Price promotions, therefore, present an untapped policy 
to influence diet and reduce obesity among the population (Zorbas et al., 
2019). 
Following the increasing prevalence of obesity in the UK, the UK and 
Scottish governments have proposed policy reforms through restrictions 
on price promotions on unhealthy foods and beverages (APS Group 
Scotland, 2018; Obesity Action Scotland, 2019; Pomeranz, 2014). Ac-
cording to Huse et al. restricting promotions on SSBs presents a cost- 
effective option for reducing daily energy intake by 12.52 kJ and 
mean body weight by 0.11 kg. However, the extent of cost-effectiveness 
depends strongly on how buyers and the SSB industry respond (Huse 
et al., 2020). 
To the best of our knowledge, no study has compared the potential 
effectiveness of mandatory promotion restriction versus taxing soft 
drinks based on their sugar content after the implementation of the in-
dustry levy. Recent studies have adopted the approach of either esti-
mating the effectiveness of SSB taxes (Berardi et al., 2016; Colchero 
et al., 2016; Jensen et al., 2016; Smed, 2012), e.g. the soft drinks levy on 
the sugar content of soft drinks and health (Briggs et al., 2017; Scar-
borough et al., 2020b), or evaluating the effectiveness of promotion 
restriction (Huse et al., 2020) in different countries. The later study 
assessed the potential effectiveness of mandatory restrictions on pro-
motions for SSBs in Australia using consumption data from Australia and 
SSB sales data from the UK. They applied a multi-state, multiple-cohort 
Markov model to estimate the impact on obesity and cost impact. They 
concluded that mandatory restriction of price promotions on SSBs is 
likely to be more cost-effective. Mexico implemented a 1 peso per litre 
excise tax on SSBs in January 2014. Colchero et al. (2016) estimated the 
changes in beverage purchases for 2014 and 2015. They concluded that 
purchases of SSBs reduced by 5.5 percent in 2014 and 9.7 per cent in 
2015. Even though these two studies suggest that SSB taxes and 
mandatory promotion restrictions are effective in reducing the 
consumption of SSBs, they are geographically and methodologically 
incomparable. There is therefore a need to empirically estimate which of 
the two policies is more effective in reducing dietary sugar and energy 
intake. We have used an Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) demand model 
to estimate and compare the potential effectiveness of the two policies. 
The tax level imposed on soft drinks was based on their average sugar 
content. A similar taxation strategy has been suggested by Dimbleby for 
sugar (£3/kg) and salt (£6/kg) content of processed foods sold in su-
permarkets, restaurants, and catering, sparing only small companies 
such as takeaways (Quinn, 2021). We estimated an average sugar con-
tent of about 78 g per litre for soft drinks. This suggests that the average 
soft drink will now attract a tax rate corresponding to mid-sugar content 
drinks – 18 pence/litre. To assess the implications of restricting pro-
motions on soft drinks, we have set the promotional index of soft drinks 
in the EASI demand model to zero and calculated the net effect on both 
demand and nutrient purchases. 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: Unlike previous 
studies evaluating the health effect of the UK soft drinks levy (Bandy 
et al., 2020; Briggs et al., 2017), a major contribution of this paper is the 
ex-ante evaluation of the soft drinks industry levy in Scotland using 
home scan data following the implementation of the tax. Unlike Briggs 
et al. the tax rate is based on the actual sugar content of soft drinks 
bought in 2018. Second, this is the first paper to modify the EASI de-
mand model to incorporate promotional indices estimated following 
Drèze et al. (2004) and Revoredo-Giha et al. (2018). Unlike Huse et al. 
(2020) or Scarborough et al. (2020), this paper compares the effec-
tiveness of the industry levy to restricting promotions on sugar con-
sumption and body weight. In addition, the EASI demand model is 
modified to incorporate unobserved household heterogeneity in our 
policy simulation. Finally, the results are presented for different de-
mographic groups in Scotland to bring to light the distributional impact 
of the measures. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the data used in this study. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
model applied to our data and the simulation scenarios. Section 4 shows 
the main results and brief discussions. The paper ends with conclusions. 
2. Data and empirical model 
The econometric dataset used for the analysis was constructed from 
the Kantar Worldpanel database from 2013 to 2017 i.e., before the 
introduction of the soft drinks industry levy. Kantar Worldpanel collects 
data from a representative panel of households across Great Britain; 
however, this study was focused on Scotland. The dataset contains food 
purchases intended for home consumption from a range of retail shops 
including traditional grocery stores, super- and hyper- markets, and 
convenience shops. All food products were identified by their universal 
product code (UPC). Households were made to scan the UPC of each 
product purchased, type of promotion2 and promotional prices, date of 
purchase, retail store, location, and the quantity of each product pur-
chased. Retail promotions usually last a week and run from Thursday of 
one week to Wednesday of the following week. We identified all 
households who made use of temporary price discounts during their 
shopping trip in the week. At the end of each week, participating 
households transmit their purchase data electronically to Kantar 
Worldpanel. 
A panel of 2,568 unique households who were present in the dataset 
for more than 40 weeks were used for the analysis. Household-specific 
information that was included in the dataset was age, gender, social 
class, location, Scottish index of multiple deprivation (SIMD), number of 
children, number of adults, and life stage. 
Based on the UK ‘Eat Well’ guidelines, beverages were aggregated 
2 Includes temporary price reductions, multi-buy offers and buy-one-get-one 
free offers. 
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into five categories: mineral water, soft drinks, juices, other drinks, and 
drinks with health claims. All other groceries purchased by the house-
hold were aggregated into a numeraire category3. This allows us to 
model the complete basket of foods purchased by each consumer in the 
panel. 
To estimate the product group prices and promotional indices, this 
study follows the approach of Drèze et al. (2004). The approach requires 
group price to be computed using a weighted average of the prices of the 
individual products in each group. The advantage of using this method 
to compute the category price is that category price during a given trip 
by a given household would reflect the price of all products the house-
hold might buy. However, using a weighted average to construct price 
indices comes with its challenges. For instance, what items to include 
and what the weighting scheme should be (Drèze et al., 2004; Revoredo- 
Giha et al., 2018). This study followed the approach proposed by 
Manchanda, Ansari, and Gupta (1999) and Krishnamurthi and Raj 
(1988) to deal with these challenges. Unlike Manchanda et al. (1999) 
and Krishnamurthi and Raj (1988) who used only multi-buys, we 
considered all types of price promotions for our analysis. Thus, the 
overall price for a category in our data was estimated as the weighted 
average of product prices in effect that year where the weights4 are the 
share of each product bought by the household in that year. 
The mathematical formula for computing the group expenditure, 
weighted prices, and promotion variables is below (number): 










Finally, the group promotional index for each household, Prhjt was 




prst.whs (3)  
where: 
Prhjt is 1 if product s was on promotion during trip t; 0 otherwise. 
pst is the price of product s during time t. 
qhst is the quantity of product s bought by household h at time t. 
s = number of individual products in category j. 
t = time period from 1…T 
The weights associated with product s in household h, whs was 








Since not all households purchased all five beverages, missing prices 
were replaced with the mean prices from adjacent regions. 
The summary of the data is presented in Table 1. Drinks with health 
claims are the most consumed beverage followed by soft drinks. All 
other types of drinks that were not in any of the four categories were 
summed into other drinks representing 0.26 per cent of drinks bought 
between 2013 and 2017. Non-consuming households were 16 per cent, 
3.3 per cent, 23.2 per cent, 24.1 per cent and 2.5 per cent for mineral 
water, soft drinks, juices, other drinks and drinks with healthy claims, 
respectively. In terms of promotions, drinks with health claims had the 
highest promotional index followed by soft drinks. Among the five 
beverages, mineral water had the lowest average price per litre whilst 
the ‘other drinks’ category had the highest average price. 
Table 2 presents the household’s sociodemographic characteristics. 
Sociodemographic data that were considered in the analysis included 
the life stage of respondents, SIMD, income levels, gender, age, number 
of children, and number of adults in the household. Gender, age, number 
of children, and number of adults were included in the model as 
explanatory variables. 
The majority of the respondents (67.5 per cent) lived in urban areas 
whilst the remaining 32.5 per cent lived in remote small towns, acces-
sible small towns, and accessible rural areas. The Scottish 2017 census 
data show that 71 per cent of households live in urban areas (The 
Scottish Government, 2018). The SIMD is the Scottish Government’s 
standard approach to identify areas of multiple deprivation in Scotland. 
This considers the extent to which residents in an area are deprived of 
income, employment, education, health, access to services, level crime 
rate, and housing. Table 2 shows that 16.5 per cent of respondents are in 
the first quintile, 21.5 per cent are in the second quintile, 20.5 per cent 
are in the third quintile, 21.04 per cent are in the fourth quintile and 
18.4 per cent are in the fifth quintile. The distribution is quite similar to 
that found in Scotland in 2017 (see The Scottish Government, 2018). 
Table 1 
Mean budget shares, prices, and promotional indices of purchases from 2013 to 
2017.  






Mineral water  0.38  0.57  1.28  16.00 
Soft drinks  1.22  1.39  2.32  3.30 
Juices  0.34  0.92  1.29  23.20 
Other drinks  0.26  1.55  1.16  24.10 
Drinks with 
health claims  
1.84  1.28  3.61  2.50 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data, 2021. 
Table 2 
Average household characteristics.  
Demographics Distribution (%) Std. dev. 95% confidence 
interval 
Life stage     
Pre-family  13.62  0.004  0.129  0.144 
Young family  11.65  0.004  0.110  0.123 
Middle family  7.93  0.003  0.073  0.085 
Older family  8.92  0.003  0.083  0.095 
45 + no children  57.87  0.004  0.110  0.123 
Scottish Deprivation Multiple Index 
SIMD quintile 1  16.50  0.004  0.157  0.173 
SIMD quintile 2  21.46  0.005  0.206  0.223 
SIMD quintile 3  20.53  0.004  0.197  0.214 
SIMD quintile 4  21.04  0.004  0.202  0.219 
SIMD quintile 5  18.40  0.004  0.176  0.192 
N/A  2.08  0.002  0.018  0.024 
Location 
Large Urban Areas  28.27  0.005  0.273  0.292 
Other Urban Areas  39.20  0.005  0.381  0.403 
Accessible Small Towns  8.93  0.003  0.083  0.096 
Remote Small Towns  3.42  0.002  0.030  0.038 
Accessible Rural Areas  13.81  0.004  0.131  0.146 
Remote Rural Areas  6.36  0.003  0.058  0.069 
Income Groups 
£0 - £29,999  58.49  0.003  0.083  0.095 
£30,000 - £39,999  17.55  0.005  0.234  0.252 
£40,000 - £49,999  11.89  0.005  0.231  0.250 
£50,000 - £59,999  6.22  0.004  0.164  0.180 
£60,000 - over  5.85  0.004  0.109  0.123 
Gender (=1 if male)  27.48  0.005  0.265  0.284 
Average age  51.13  0.150  50.840  51.427 
Average number of children  0.48  0.009  0.465  0.502 
Average number of adults  2.08  0.022  2.033  2.120  
3 The numeraire category included all other food products.  
4 Weight given to each item is the share of expenditure of that item over the 
whole span of the study for the given individual. 
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About 2 per cent of the respondents did not belong to any of the five 
quintiles. By life stage5, consumers were identified as belonging to one 
of the following: pre-family (13.6 per cent), young family (11.7 per 
cent), middle and older family (16.9 per cent), and family without 
children (11.7 per cent). According to income groups, the majority of the 
respondents (58.4 per cent) earned less than £29,999. However, only 
about 12.07 per cent of the respondents earned more than £50,000. This 
figure is slightly lower than the 2017 Scottish census data, which shows 
that 63 per cent of households earn below £30,000 (The Scottish Gov-
ernment, 2018). 
The data contain nutritional information on all products purchased 
by UPC. Nutritional information contained in the dataset includes car-
bohydrates, proteins, total fats, saturated fats, sugar, fibre, and sodium. 
The impact of eliminating all forms of promotion versus Soft Drinks 
Industry levy were assessed from the energy and nutritional context. 
Table 3 presents the mean quantities of nutrients and energy con-
tained in the drinks. Soft drinks contain the lowest amounts of protein 
and fat per 100 ml. However, they have the highest amount of carbo-
hydrates. The ‘other drinks’ category has the highest amount of sugar 
followed by soft drinks. Soft drinks are of public interest as they contain 
a relatively high amount of calories and sugar but the lowest amount of 
protein. This explains the large number of policies directed at soft drinks 
worldwide. Despite the low nutritional composition of soft drinks, 
Table 1 shows that it is the second most important beverage in the basket 
of consumers. 
3. Empirical methodology: EASI demand model 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
Temporary price reductions are widely used by retailers to induce 
shoppers to visit the promoting store and purchase promoted and non-
promoted products. Inman and Winer (1999) suggest that about 60 per 
cent of household supermarket purchases are due to in-store decisions. 
Temporary price reductions, therefore, have a positive effect on total 
household shopping expenditure during a shopping trip. Richards and 
Padilla (2009) studied the effect of price promotions on the demand for 
fast foods. They used Canadian panel data for their analysis. They find 
that price promotions increase the demand for fast foods and have a 
similar effect on restaurant market shares. 
Most research work has been done on the impact of promotions on 
retail sales, specifically on intra-category and inter-category demand 
(Gupta, 1988; Leeflang and Parreño-Selva, 2012; Nijs et al., 2001; Sun 
et al., 2003). These studies focus on maximizing retail sales using price 
promotions ignoring the potential effects of promotions on health. For 
instance, Gupta (1988) was interested in the promotional effect on sales 
due to brand switching, purchase time acceleration, and stockpiling. 
Leeflang and Parreño-Selva (2012) focused on the inter-category effect 
of promotions. We deviate from these previous studies by adopting a 
consumer demand approach where the consumer allocates expenditures 
between a numéraire good and five beverage groups. The demand model 
adopted here is an extension of the EASI demand model that allows us to 
model the effect of banning promotions on energy and nutrient 
purchases. 
To be able to incorporate the effect of eliminating promotions on soft 
drinks on net energy and nutrient intake, we modified the EASI demand 
systems to incorporate promotional indices. We expected that promo-
tion for soft drinks at any given shopping occasion would have a positive 
impact on the expenditure share of soft drinks but a negative impact on 
the share of the remaining beverages. As such, eliminating promotions 
on soft drinks should decline the expenditure share of soft drinks. 
However, the impact on the remaining drinks would depend on the level 
of substitution between soft drinks and the other drinks. The promo-
tional indices are incorporated in the model as observed household 
heterogeneity. 
3.2. Estimating elasticities 
The demand model used comprised of the budget shares of house-




bryrh +AlnPh +Czn +DPrh + uh (10)  
where the index h corresponds to a household; W*h, is a j vector of latent 
budget shares; yh is the log total real expenditure, log prices lnP is the j 
vector of commodity price indices in (2); Pr is a vector of promotional 
indices faced by household h; z is a an n vector of sociodemographic 
characteristics; uh is the error term which captures unobserved house-
hold heterogeneity. A, C, D and br are matrices and vectors of parameters 
to be estimated. We followed the approach proposed by Zhen et al. 
(2013) by estimating a Tobit6 form of the EASI demand model where the 
latent budget share W*h is related to observed budget share wh according 
to wh ≡ max(0, W*h). The wh is calculated as the category expenditure 
divided by the annual expenditure. 







Ấ wh (11)  
where xh is the total nominal expenditure. 
The real food expenditure (yh) makes the budget share equation to be 
linear7 in parameters. For the demand model to be consistent with 
theory the budget share equations wh are required to satisfy the prop-
erties of adding up and homogeneity through: 





Caloric and nutritional contents of beverages consumed in Scotland  








Energy(kcal)  28.77  341.01  367.17  369.55  32.44 
Protein(g)  0.89  0.08  3.45  6.34  0.22 
Carbohydrate 
(g)  
4.36  83.15  82.55  76.45  4.92 
Sugar(g)  4.06  78.54  80.39  70.07  4.36 
Fat(g)  0.50  0.03  0.38  2.55  0.07 
Saturates(g)  0.07  0.01  0.06  1.45  0.04 
Fibre(g)  0.16  0.21  2.06  2.65  0.19 
Sodium(g)  0.00  0.04  0.37  0.21  0.11 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
5 Life stage was categorised by GB Kantar FMCG as pre-family (main shopper 
under 45 years, no children), young family (youngest child 0–4 years), middle 
family (youngest child 5–9 years), older family (youngest child 10+ years), and 
older dependents (main shopper 45+ years, no children, 3+ adults). 
6 Zhen et al. (2013) suggest that this approach circumvents the empirical 
difficulties of imposing nonnegativity restrictions under the Kuhn-Tucker 
framework when estimating demand model with high proportion of non- 
consuming households.  
7 Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) compared the actual model with the linear 
approximate model and show that there are not major differences between the 
parameters from both models. 
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1’jb0 = 1, 1
’
jbr = 0∀r ∕= 0 (12) 
Finally, Slutsky symmetry is ensured by the symmetry of the J × J 
matrices of A. 
There are two sources of endogeneity. First, the presence of budget 
shares in the stone index makes this index to be endogenous, however, 
according to Lewbel and Pendakur (2009), this type of endogeneity is 
numerically unimportant. The second source of endogeneity is that the 
real food expenditure yh is a function of the endogenous food group 
expenditure (xh). We have controlled for this form of endogeneity 
following the approach proposed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) by 
using the real food expenditure yh (estimated by replacing the budget 














Demand analyses considered five different household groups: (1) the 
entire sample; (2) SIMD; (3) Rural-urban classification (4) household 
income ranges and (5) life stage group. The final model was estimated 
using iterative 3-Stage least Squares to account for endogeneity. 
Expenditure elasticities, Hicksian and Marshallian price elasticities, 
as well as promotional elasticities, were derived from (10) following 
Castellón, Boonsaeng, and Carpio, (2015) and Lewbel and Pendakur 
(2009). The compensated Hicksian price elasticity of demand for good k 
with respect to the price of the good j was derived by 
∈= w− 1(B)+Ωw − I (14)  
where ∈ is an n × n matrix of compensated demand elasticities, w is an 
identity matrix where the ones have been replaced by the group budget 
shares, Ω is an n × n matrix of ones and I is an identity matrix. 
The vector of expenditure elasticities ϑ were subsequently derived by 
ϑ = (w)− 1(I + ApẤ)− 1A+ 1n (15)  
where ϑ is the J X 1 vector of estimated expenditure elasticities, A is the 
expenditure semi-elasticity coefficients which is 
∑5
r=0Aryr, p is a vector 
of mean prices and 1j is a J × 1 vector of ones. 
The matrix of uncompensated Marshallian elasticities, ε, were 
derived from the Slutsky equation given by 
ε =∈ − wϑ (16) 
The matrix of promotional elasticities, θ were derived using 
θ = w− 1(D)*Pr (17)  
where D is j × j matrix of promotional coefficients, and Pr is an identity 
matrix where the ones have been replaced by the mean promotional 
indices, and w is an identity matrix where the ones have been replaced 
by the group budget shares. 
3.3. Simulations 
The present paper aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of eliminating 
promotions on soft drinks and compare the results to a tax imposition on 
soft drinks based on the UK’s soft drinks industry levy assuming a pass- 
through effect of 50 per cent8. The price impact of the soft drinks levy is 
dependent on how the industry implements it. Firms are expected to 1) 
reformulate to reduce sugar concentration; 2) raise the prices that 
consumers pay for; and/or 3) initiate activities to reduce the market 
share of high and mid-sugar soft drinks (Briggs et al., 2017). Using data 
following the implementation of the soft drinks levy, we estimated the 
average sugar content in soft drinks (see Table 3) and this suggested that 
the average soft drink will attract a tax of mid-sugar soft drink levy. 
According to the Office for Budget Responsibility, the levy will be 18 
pence per litre on mid-sugar soft drinks and 24 pence per litre high-sugar 
soft drinks. According to Briggs et al. (2017), if all the taxes are passed to 
the consumer this will cause a price increase of about 75 per cent for the 
concentrated high-sugar soft drinks and 31 per cent for the regular high- 
sugar soft drinks. Since the tax was to be imposed on the firm and not the 
consumer, we assumed a pass-through of only 50 per cent of the tax to 
consumers corresponding to 9 pence per litre. The impacts were quan-
tified in terms of changes in weekly energy and nutritional purchases 
from beverages. 
The change in the quantities, total expenditure, and expenditure 







.Qi (5)  
ΔEi = ΔQi*Pi (6)  
ΔWi = ΔEi/Ei (7)  
where ΔQiQi and 
ΔPi
Pi represent the percentage change in quantities and 
price of the i-th beverage, ∈ij are the price elasticities, ΔEi is the change 
in expenditure after the tax, and ΔWi is the change in budget shares after 
the tax. 
Finally, the post-tax changes in energy and nutrient were estimated 
as the difference in the nutrient purchase with and without the tax: 
ΔNi = ΔQi.ℵ (8) 
ΔNi is the change in nutrient for the i-th beverage and ℵ is the 
nutritional coefficient for the i-th beverage. 
In contrast to the soft drinks industry levy, the study proposes the 
elimination of promotions9 (excluding temporary price reductions) on 
soft drinks sold in retail shops in Scotland. The impact of the proposed 
policy was estimated on weekly energy and nutrient purchases from 
beverages. To estimate the impact of eliminating promotions, we started 
by setting advertising promotions on soft drinks to zero (i.e. Pr = 0). 
Assuming that prices and expenditure are constant, changes in calories 














where X is the average total weekly expenditure, Pg is the average price 
of category g,.Prj is the average promotional index, and ℵig is the 
nutrient i coefficient of food group g. 
∑J







X is the change in expenditure and the change in 










8 Changes in consumption are linear suggesting that at 100 per cent pass- 
through rate changes in consumption will only double. An estimate by Scar-
borough et al. (2020b) suggest that prices of high levy category drinks 
increased by £0.075 suggesting a pass-through rate of 31 per cent. We chose a 
higher figure due to differences in estimation procedure and data aggregation. 
9 Note this does not mean that prices cannot change, only that they cannot be 
promoted/advertised. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Price, expenditure, and promotional elasticities 
Table 4 presents the price and expenditure elasticities of the 
average10 sample. All own-price elasticities and expenditure elasticities 
and most cross-price elasticities are significant at the 5 per cent signif-
icance level. Among the five beverage categories, mineral water, other 
drinks, and drinks with health claims are price elastic whilst soft drinks 
and juices are price inelastic. The elasticities of soft drinks and juices 
confirm results by Revoredo-Giha et al. (2018), however, the estimate 
for soft drinks differs from results found in Mexico (Colchero et al., 
2015) and Chile (Guerrero-López et al., 2017). Scottish consumers are 
less responsive to price changes in soft drinks compared to consumers in 
Mexico and Chile. Price elasticity for mineral water tallies with the 
result found in Mexico (Colchero et al., 2015). All expenditure elastici-
ties are elastic, suggesting that consumers consider these beverages as 
luxury goods. This makes our expenditure elasticities for soft drinks and 
juice higher than that found by Revoredo-Giha et al. (2018). The vari-
ation in the results could be attributed to differences in the data ag-
gregation and the duration considered. 
Table 5 presents the promotional elasticities for the average sample. 
All own price promotional elasticities are positive and significant at a 5 
per cent level. Among the beverages, ‘other drinks’ are the most 
responsive to promotions whilst mineral water is the least responsive to 
promotions. The cross-promotional elasticities for soft drinks show that 
an increase in promotions for mineral water, juices, and drinks with 
health claims will reduce demand for soft drinks. On the contrary, an 
increase in promotions for ‘other drinks’ will increase the demand for 
soft drinks. 
4.2. The distributional effect of a ban on promotions versus soft drinks 
levy on beverage demand 
4.2.1. Average sample 
Table 6 compares the effectiveness of banning promotions on soft 
drinks compared to imposing a tax according to the soft drinks levy on 
net demand for beverages. Three main demand variables were consid-
ered: changes in expenditure shares, changes in total expenditures, and 
changes in quantities of beverages consumed per person per year. The 
results indicate that the former is more effective than the latter. For 
instance, the net expenditure share allocated to beverages reduces by 
24.2 per cent when promotions are banned compared to 2.25 per cent 
when soft drinks are taxed. 
4.2.2. Scottish index of multiple deprivation 
Table 7 compares the changes in demand across different households 
based on their SIMD. Overall, the results suggest that the ban on pro-
motions will be more effective than imposing then implementing the soft 
drinks levy. However, the impact of both policies varies by SIMD. For the 
ban on promotions, households in the least deprived areas (SIMD 5) will 
reduce their expenditure by 28 per cent whilst households in the most 
deprived areas will reduce their expenditure shares by 17 per cent; about 
11 per cent lower. This suggest that persons living in highly deprived 
areas are less responsive to the ban on promotion. For instance, Turrell 
et al. (2002) found that consumers from socioeconomically disadvan-
taged backgrounds are less like to purchase healthy foods i.e. low in 
sugar, salt, and fat. The high reduction in quantity for persons living in 
the least deprived areas confirms findings by Nakamura et al., (2015) 
that higher socioeconomic groups are more responsive to promotions in 
general on any food category. For the soft drinks levy, the highest 
reduction in expenditure shares is 2.4 per cent for households in the least 
deprived areas (SIMD 5) and the lowest reduction is 1.7 per cent for 
those living in less deprived areas (SIMD 4). In summary, the results 
suggest that government policies do not have the same effects across 
different household types. 
4.2.3. Households based on their location 
Like previous tables, in Table 8, banning promotion is more effective 
than the soft drinks levy. For the ban on promotions, households living 
in large urban areas reduce their expenditures more than those living in 
other urban areas (difference of 9 per cent). For households in small 
towns, those living in remote small towns reduce expenditure more than 
those in accessible small towns (a difference of 5.5 per cent). The largest 
variations were estimated for households in rural areas, where those 
living in accessible rural areas reduced their expenditure shares more 
than those in remote rural areas (a difference of 12.5 per cent). In 
general, the expenditure shares of rural dwellers will be more affected 
than urban dwellers. For the soft drinks levy, households living in other 
urban areas reduce their expenditure more than those in large urban 
areas (0.34 per cent difference). For small towns, households living in 
accessible small towns reduce their expenditure shares more than those 
in remote small towns (a difference of 0.47 per cent). For rural areas, 
households in accessible rural areas reduce their expenditure shares by 
0.15 per cent more than those in remote rural areas. Overall, the levy is 
more effective on urban dwellers than those in small towns. 
4.2.4. Life stage 
Table 9 compares the effectiveness of banning promotions versus the 
soft drinks levy across households based on their life stage. Banning 
promotions reduces expenditure shares of households aged 45 and 
without children (28 per cent) more than any other household group. 
Households with the least reductions in expenditures are those consid-
ered as middle families (16 per cent). In terms of quantity, the highest 
reduction was estimated for the pre-family group (45 kg.) whilst the 
lowest reduction was estimated for the middle family group. The huge 
reduction in the quantities by the pre-family group following the ban on 
promotions confirms findings by Freeman et al., (2016) that young 
adults are the target populations for energy-dense, nutrient-poor and 
beverage marketing. For the soft drinks levy, households in the young 
family group have the highest reduction in expenditure shares (2.9 per 
cent) whilst those in the middle family group have the least reductions in 
expenditure shares. In summary, middle family groups are the least 
responsive to both policies. 
4.2.5. Income groups 
Table 10 compares the effectiveness of banning promotions versus 
the soft drinks levy based on income levels. For the ban on promotions, a 
household with an annual income of £40,000 - £49,999 have the highest 
reduction in expenditure shares whilst those earning £50,000 - £59,999 
have the lowest reduction in expenditure shares (a difference of 13.1 per 
cent). However, in terms of changes in quantities, households with an 
annual income of £60,000 and more have the highest reduction in net 
quantities whilst those £50,000 - £59,999 had the lowest reduction. For 
the soft drinks levy, households earning £40,000 - £49,999 annually had 
the highest reduction in expenditure shares whilst those earning 
£60,000 – over had the lowest reduction. Changes in net quantities of 
beverages consumed follow the same pattern. 
4.3. The distributional effect of a ban on promotions versus soft drinks 
levy on change in sugar consumption, energy, and body weight 
We have used results from a study by Apovian (2004) to simulate the 
implication of changes in sugar consumption on body weights. 
10 Price, promotional and expenditure elasticities for the distributional anal-
ysis are available upon request. They have been omitted due to space 
limitations. 
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According to the study, one can of sugar-sweetened soda drink contains 
150 kcal and 40–50 g.11 of sugar. Therefore, if a person consumes one 
can of sugar-sweetened soda drink (equivalent to 40–50 g.) each day for 
a year he will increase his body weight by 6.75 kg. Under this 
assumption, we estimated the impact of both the ban on promotions and 
Table 4 
Mean uncompensated price and expenditure elasticities.  
Product Mineral water Soft drinks Juices Other drinks Drinks with health claims Others Expenditure 
Mineral Water − 1.491  0.019 − 0.171  0.150  0.010  0.010 − 0.002  
(0.0376)  (0.0107) (0.0364)  (0.0343)  (0.0071)  (0.0003) (0.043) 
Soft drinks 0.054  − 0.938 0.054  0.060  0.020  0.023 − 0.015  
(0.0344)  (0.0260) 0.0406  (0.0367)  (0.0132)  (0.0005) (0.029) 
Juices − 0.153  0.016 − 0.984  0.100  − 0.037  − 0.037 − 0.003  
(0.0322)  (0.0112) (0.0703)  (0.0511)  (0.0073)  (0.0004) (0.050) 
Other drinks 0.098  0.013 0.075  − 1.437  0.008  0.009 − 0.003  
(0.0230)  (0.0077) (0.0387)  (0.0562)  (0.0049)  (0.0003) (0.045) 
Drinks with health claims 0.045  0.038 − 0.198  0.065  − 1.085  − 1.081 − 0.018  
(0.0342)  (0.0200) (0.0395)  (0.0355)  (0.01990  (0.0005) (0.023) 
Others − 1.190  − 1.367 − 1.094  − 1.227  − 1.326  − 1.297 − 1.946  
(0.0003)  (0.0005) (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0005)  (0.0436) (0.001) 
*Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
Table 5 
Mean promotional elasticities.  
Products Mineral water Soft drinks Juices Other drinks Drinks with health claims Numeraire 
Mineral Water  0.314 − 0.017 − 0.019 − 0.004 − 0.032 − 0.435   
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.000) 
Soft drinks  − 0.003 0.468 − 0.006 0.002 − 0.123 − 0.335   
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0001) 
Juices  − 0.043 − 0.150 0.487 0.000 − 0.181 − 0.472   
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.0001) 
Other drinks  0.075 0.184 − 0.035 0.669 0.253 − 1.560   
(0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.0002) 
Drinks with health claims  − 0.002 − 0.029 − 0.005 − 0.003 0.370 − 0.169   
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.0001) 
Numeraire  0.000 − 0.002 0.000 0.000 − 0.005 0.006   
(0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008) (0.0002) 
*Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
Table 6 
Compares changes in demand for the average household.   
Net change in demand (per person per year) 
Demand variables Banning promotions Soft drinks levy 
Δ in share − 24.15% − 2.25% 
Δ in expenditure − 27.32% − 2.21% 
Δ in quantity − 35.80% − 1.36% 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
Table 7 
Compares changes in demand for households based on their SIMD.  
Net change in demand (per person per year) 
SIMD Demand variable Banning promotions Soft drinks levy 
1 Δ in share − 16.89% − 2.31% 
Δ in expenditure − 19.94% − 2.19% 
Δ in quantity − 27.13% − 1.44% 
2 Δ in share − 27.50% − 2.50% 
Δ in expenditure − 30.24% − 2.40% 
Δ in quantity − 39.57% − 1.55% 
3 Δ in share –23.58% − 2.25% 
Δ in expenditure − 25.73% − 2.32% 
Δ in quantity − 36.57% − 1.39% 
4 Δ in share − 27.14% − 1.74% 
Δ in expenditure − 30.02% − 1.73% 
Δ in quantity − 38.35% − 0.93% 
5 Δ in share − 28.02% − 2.44% 
Δ in expenditure –32.35% − 2.43% 
Δ in quantity − 40.08% − 1.55% 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
Table 8 
Compares changes in demand for households based on their location.  







Large urban areas Δ in share − 28.54% − 2.06% 
Δ in expenditure − 31.07% − 2.00% 
Δ in quantity − 45.65% − 1.23% 
Other urban areas Δ in share − 19.42% − 2.40% 
Δ in expenditure –22.68% − 2.30% 
Δ in quantity − 29.45% − 1.49% 
Accessible small 
towns 
Δ in share − 20.21% − 1.92% 
Δ in expenditure –22.53% − 1.86% 
Δ in quantity − 26.08% − 1.16% 
Remote small towns Δ in share − 25.77% − 1.45% 
Δ in expenditure − 26.97% − 1.66% 
Δ in quantity − 39.51% − 0.94% 
Accessible rural Δ in share − 34.57% − 2.32% 
Δ in expenditure − 39.23% − 2.41% 
Δ in quantity − 51.14% − 1.29% 
Remote rural Δ in share –22.01% − 2.17% 
Δ in expenditure − 25.53% − 2.15% 
Δ in quantity − 27.47% − 1.38% 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
11 Our simulation is based on the average figure i.e. 45 g of sugar. 
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the soft drinks levy on body weights using changes in annual sugar 
consumption per person. We have also estimated the changes in annual 
calorie consumption per person. 
First, Table 11 shows that for the average household, banning pro-
motions on soft drinks will reduce annual sugar (calories) consumption 
per person by 9.1 per cent (12.6 per cent), which is equivalent to 0.85 kg 
loss of body weight. On the contrary, the soft drinks levy will reduce 
annual sugar (calories) consumption per person by 3.9 per cent (3.55 per 
cent) which is equivalent to 0.36 kg loss of body weight. The current 
results support the argument that price promotions increase the con-
sumption of unhealthy foods (Watt et al., 2020) since banning them 
reduces soft drinks purchases more than taxation. Results also support 
the argument that taxing unhealthy foods reduces their consumption 
(Briggs et al., 2017; Guerrero-López et al., 2017). In addition, combining 
both taxation and banning promotions will be more effective in reducing 
calorie and sugar intake. Despite the huge reduction in calories and 
sugar purchases, there could be trade-offs to other less healthy food 
products like snacks and candy which have not been taxed or restricted 
from promotions. In that case, the changes could be lower than 
estimated. 
Second, we compare the impact of both policies on households based 
on their SIMD. For the ban on promotions, the lowest reduction in sugar 
(calories) consumption of 0.13 per cent (3.49 per cent) was estimated for 
households living in the most deprived areas (quintile 1); equivalent to a 
0.01 kg. reduction in body weight. In contrast, the highest reduction of 
17 per cent was estimated for households living in the least deprived 
areas (quintile 5); equivalent to a 1.39 kg. reduction in body weight. 
However, if soft drinks are taxed, the lowest reduction in sugar (calories) 
is 3.1 per cent (2.9 per cent) for a household in the fourth quintile, which 
is equivalent to a weight loss of 0.28 kg. whilst the highest reduction of 
4.8 per cent (4.3) was estimated for households in the second quintile, 
which is equivalent to 0.46 kg. of weight loss. 
Third, we compare the impact of both policies on a household by 
their location. For the ban on promotions, the least reduction in sugar 
(calories) consumption of 2.5 per cent (6.3 per cent) was estimated for 
households living in remote small towns, which is equivalent to an 
annual weight loss of 0.29 kg. Whilst the highest reduction in sugar 
(calories) consumption of 21.1 per cent (25 per cent) was estimated for 
those in accessible rural areas, which is equivalent to an annual weight 
loss of 2 kg. For the soft drinks levy, like the ban on promotions, the 
lowest reduction in sugar (calorie) consumption of 2.1 per cent (1.99 per 
cent) was estimated for households living in remote small towns, which 
is equivalent to an annual weight loss of 0.24 kg. However, the highest 
reduction of 4.23 per cent (3.9 per cent) was estimated for households 
living in other urban areas; this is equivalent to an annual weight loss of 
0.41 kg. Colchero, Molina, and Guerrero-López (2017) also found that 
the effect of food policies tends to vary by location of the household. 
Therefore, to achieve the highest effect, the tax level should vary by 
location. 
Fourth, we compare the impact of both policies on households based 
on their life stage. For the ban on soft drinks promotions, the lowest 
reduction in annual sugar (calorie) consumption was 1.4 per cent (5.9 
per cent) for households in the older family group; equivalent to a 
weight loss of 0.15 kg. Whereas the highest reduction in annual sugar 
(calorie) of 13 per cent (16.27 per cent) was estimated for households in 
the 45 + no children group; equivalent to an annual weight loss of 1.15 
kg. For the soft drinks levy, the lowest reduction in sugar (calorie) 
consumption of 3.5 per cent (3.2 per cent) was estimated for older family 
households; equivalent to an annual weight loss of 0.31 kg. But the 
highest reduction in sugar (calorie) was 4.95 per cent (4.47 per cent) for 
older families, which is equivalent to an annual weight loss of 0.51 kg. 
The results of the ban on promotion are opposite that of the soft drinks 
levy. Our results confirm previous studies like that of Garcia-Muros et al. 
(2017) that accessed the distributional effects of carbon-based taxes in 
Spain; they found that the tax incidence differs by the life stage of the 
household head. This confirms our results that fiscal policy measures 
like taxes and restrictions on promotion will have a different impact on 
households based on their life stage. Contrary to findings by Briggs et al. 
(2013) the tax is more effective on the older family households than 
other household types. 
Finally, we compare the impact of both the ban on promotions and 
the soft drinks levy on households based on their income groups. For the 
ban on promotions on soft drinks, the lowest reduction in sugar (calorie) 
consumption was 0.2 per cent (4.19 per cent) for households earning 
£50,000 - £59,999 per annum; equivalent to an annual weight loss of 
0.02 kg. However, the highest reduction in sugar (calorie) was 17.6 per 
cent (20.8 per cent) for households earning £40,000 - £49,999 per 
annum; equivalent to an annual weight loss of 1.55 kg. For the soft 
drinks levy, the lowest reduction in sugar (calorie) was 3.49 per cent 
(3.13 per cent) for households earning £60,000 – over; equivalent to a 
weight loss of 0.23 kg. However, the highest reduction in sugar (calorie) 
consumption was 4.58 per cent (4.08 per cent) for households earning 
£50,000 - £59,999 per annum; equivalent to an annual weight loss of 
0.38 kg. High-income earners reduce their consumption more probably 
due to the substitution towards more healthy drinks 
In summary, our results suggest that banning promotions is more 
effective across different demographic groups than implementing the 
soft drinks levy. This is supported by Liu, Lopez, and Zhu (2014) who 
found that banning advertisements for carbonated soft drinks was more 
effective than taxing them based on their calorie content. Furthermore, 
we have shown that banning promotions has the potential to reduce 
Table 9 
Compares changes in demand for households based on their life stage.  
Net change in demand (per person per year) 






Pre-family Δ in share − 26.69% − 2.71% 
Δ in expenditure − 30.10% − 2.87% 
Δ in quantity − 43.52% − 1.77% 
Young family Δ in share − 18.14% − 2.87% 
Δ in expenditure − 20.99% − 2.80% 
Δ in quantity − 30.10% − 1.87% 
Middle family Δ in share − 16.13% − 1.87% 
Δ in expenditure − 17.95% − 1.79% 
Δ in quantity − 24.19% − 1.09% 
Older family Δ in share –22.83% − 2.77% 
Δ in expenditure − 24.96% − 2.69% 
Δ in quantity –32.91% − 1.81% 
45 + no 
children 
Δ in share − 28.31% − 1.93% 
Δ in expenditure − 31.15% − 1.86% 
Δ in quantity − 39.72% − 1.09% 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
Table 10 
Compares changes in demand for households based on their annual income level  
Net change in demand   
Banning promotions Soft drinks levy 
£0 - £29,999 Δ in share − 24.52% − 2.40% 
Δ in expenditure − 27.77% − 2.33% 
Δ in quantity − 35.54% − 1.41% 
£30,000 - £39,999 Δ in share − 20.33% − 2.14% 
Δ in expenditure –22.10% − 2.12% 
Δ in quantity − 31.88% − 1.31% 
£40,000 - £49,999 Δ in share − 29.17% − 2.46% 
Δ in expenditure − 31.58% − 2.63% 
Δ in quantity − 45.26% − 1.64% 
£50,000 - £59,999 Δ in share − 16.12% − 2.15% 
Δ in expenditure − 20.76% − 2.14% 
Δ in quantity − 25.39% − 1.36% 
£60,000 - over Δ in share − 28.33% − 1.33% 
Δ in expenditure –32.25% − 1.36% 
Δ in quantity − 48.40% − 0.63% 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
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body weights (not considering the impact of exercise). It is also worth 
mentioning that changes in demand and nutrients did not consider the 
implications of heavy drinkers on the effect of the soft drinks levy. Li and 
Dorfman (2019) found that this group of consumers is usually addicted 
to sugar-sweetened beverages and respond less to “sin” taxes. 
5. Conclusion 
Policymakers are advocating for a ban on soft drinks promotions in 
the UK. This comes after the successful implementation of the soft drinks 
levy. Empirical studies assessing the impact of the soft drinks levy sug-
gest that the levy has been very effective in reducing both sugar pur-
chases and body weights. However, there is limited information about 
the effectiveness of restricting promotions on soft drinks and how the 
results would compare with the soft drinks levy. 
Therefore, our paper provides results on the heterogeneity of 
changes in household demand and nutrient purchases of beverages 
when soft drinks are taxed versus when promotions are restricted. To 
achieve this, we have modified the EASI demand model to incorporate 
promotional indices of beverages consumed in Scotland. Changes in 
purchases were assessed by comparing the pre-tax (promotion) scenario 
with the post-tax scenario (banning promotions). Comparisons were 
made based on the net total effect of both policies on demand, energy, 
and nutrient purchases. 
The results from the present study suggest that banning promotions 
on soft drinks would be more effective in reducing calorie and sugar 
purchases than taxing soft drinks. Effectiveness of the ban on pro-
motions varied by the socioeconomic characteristics of the household i. 
e. lower-income households, pre-family households, households in 
remote small towns, and households living in most deprived areas in 
Scotland. This advocates for targeted policies instead of the usual one- 
size-fits-all governmental policy. Banning promotions could reduce the 
annual quantity of beverage intake by 35.8 per cent whilst the soft 
drinks levy results in a 1.36 per cent reduction in annual beverage 
intake. Banning promotions reduces annual sugar intake by 9 per cent 
compared to 3.9 per cent for soft drinks levy. Translating this into 
changes in body weight show that the average person will lose 0.85 kg. 
and 0.36 kg. per annum by the ban on promotions or a soft drinks levy, 
respectively. The marginal changes in body weight suggest that other 
avenues such as tax on and/or restricting promotions on dietary fat 
should be explored to achieve a larger impact. More importantly, larger 
reductions in body weights could only be achieved if the reduction in 
sugar purchases is sustained over a long period. 
The rationale for implementing policies that restrict promotions on 
soft drinks is presented in this paper. Given the similarities in the con-
sumption between Scotland and the rest of the UK, the results provide a 
clear guideline for both Scottish and UK food and drink policymakers. In 
summary, the paper advocates for restricting promotions to effectively 
control the soaring rates of overweight and obesity in Scotland. 
We acknowledge that the data used for the analysis does not fully 
represent the consumption behaviour of consumers. First, the dataset 
excludes purchases from restaurants and vending machines suggesting 
that changes in consumption may be lower than expected. Second, since 
the analysis is based on purchased data, we do not consider actual 
consumption which excludes spoilage and food waste. Third, we do not 
consider substitution from soft drinks to less healthy foods like snacks 
and candies as well as healthier foods such as fruits and vegetables, 
which could change the impacts of both policies. Though these limita-
tions are presently insurmountable, we believe their impacts are negli-
gible and the results are plausible. 
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Table 11 
Comparison of changes in body weight, sugar, and calorie consumption across different households.   
Changes in weight Changes in annual sugar consumption Changes in annual calorie consumption  
(kg person per year) (per person per year) (per person per year) 
Socioeconomic characteristics Banning promotions Soft drinks levy Banning promotions Soft drinks levy Promotion Soft drinks levy 
Average person − 0.85 − 0.36 − 9.06% − 3.89% − 12.58% − 3.55% 
SIMD 1 − 0.01 − 0.39 − 0.13% − 4.03% − 3.49% − 3.68% 
SIMD 2 − 0.71 − 0.46 − 7.33% − 4.77% − 11.99% − 4.32% 
SIMD 3 − 0.87 − 0.35 − 8.53% − 3.45% − 12.18% − 3.18% 
SIMD 4 − 1.19 − 0.28 − 13.07% − 3.13% − 15.93% − 2.88% 
SIMD 5 − 1.39 − 0.33 − 16.97% − 4.02% − 20.24% − 3.68% 
Large urban areas − 0.71 − 0.35 − 9.61% − 3.84% − 14.54% − 3.44% 
Other urban areas − 0.45 − 0.41 − 4.66% − 4.23% − 7.77% − 3.88% 
Accessible small towns − 0.55 − 0.25 − 7.14% − 3.31% − 9.64% − 3.06% 
Remote small towns − 0.29 − 0.24 − 2.53% − 2.12% − 6.27% − 1.99% 
Accessible rural areas − 2.00 − 0.38 − 21.09% − 4.04% − 25.43% − 3.67% 
Remote rural areas − 1.53 − 0.35 − 16.10% − 3.69% − 17.70% − 3.43% 
Pre-family − 0.66 − 0.51 − 5.47% − 4.25% − 10.62% − 3.90% 
Young family − 0.39 − 0.35 − 4.93% − 4.37% − 8.35% − 3.96% 
Middle family − 0.60 − 0.34 − 6.45% − 3.72% − 8.63% − 3.34% 
Older family − 0.15 − 0.51 − 1.44% − 4.95% − 5.92% − 4.47% 
45 + no children − 1.15 − 0.31 − 12.99% − 3.49% − 16.27% − 3.21% 
£0 - £29,999 − 0.72 − 0.38 − 7.19% − 3.80% − 11.00% − 3.47% 
£30,000 - £39,999 − 0.32 − 0.36 − 3.39% − 3.83% − 6.99% − 3.52% 
£40,000 - £49,999 − 1.55 − 0.34 − 17.65% − 3.92% − 20.82% − 3.64% 
£50,000 - £59,999 − 0.02 − 0.38 − 0.20% − 4.58% − 4.19% − 4.08% 
£60,000 - over − 0.87 − 0.23 − 13.09% − 3.49% − 17.52% − 3.13% 
Source: Own computation based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
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Colchero, M.A., Molina, M., Guerrero-López, C.M., 2017. After mexico implemented a 
tax, purchases of sugar-sweetened beverages decreased and water increased: 
difference by place of residence, household composition, and income level. J. Nutr. 
147 (8), 1552–1557. https://doi.org/10.3945/jn.117.251892. 
Colchero, M.A., Salgado, J.C., Unar-Munguía, M., Hernández-Ávila, M., Rivera- 
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